THE HISTORY OF MODEN RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME (1987 - 2000)

In analyzing Russian organized crime, the authors describe and classify the four major forms of organized crime: (a) political-social, (b) mercenary, (c) in-group, and (d) syndicated. Although the first three classifications existed throughout Soviet history, the syndicated form began to emerge in the late 1 950s, expanding during the corrupt Brezhnev years (1964-82), exploding during perestroika, and reaching pandemic levels after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The abrupt transformation of Russian society from a centralized command economy to one driven by the forces of market capitalism created the sociopathological conditions for the malignant spread of mercenary and especially syndicated organized crime. New criminal syndicates were created by an alliance of criminal gangs/groups and former members of the Soviet Union's communist nomenklatura (bureaucracy), and the consequence was the criminalization of much of the Russian economy. The social structure of these syndicates is based on a loose association of patron-client relationships, rather than a centralized hierarchical system; their function is to provide illicit goods/services desired by the people. The authors conclude their study by emphasizing that what has taken place in Russia is not peculiar to the Russian people, but rather exemplifies what can happen to societies that experience rapid and intense social change.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING ORGANIZED CRIME

The study of Russian organized crime encompasses the challenge and acknowledgment of all the facets of human behavior, of historical and social change, the many forms that political and economic development can take, and the complexity of the psychology and creativity of the criminal mind that seeks money and power. The Russian experience with organized crime has many lessons-economic, social, and political-from which the discipline of criminology and, indeed, nations and governments can benefit and learn. The Russian experience with organized crime is a lesson in reality. Absent here are the romance and mythology that have surrounded the image of organized crime in the United States as one originated, controlled, and centrally organized by the "Mafia," or "Cosa Nostra." To expect that the American public will finally begin to read the scholarly works on the subject to show that a belief in Mafia and Cosa Nostra has only served to excite readers and visually stimulate movie audiences is too much to ask because mythologies die only with much difficulty. They die hard because they serve a purpose; they excite, entertain, and construct social reality. But history has taught us that mythological constructs are mythology, not reality. And this is true of organized crime in America and the American public's conception of it. The study of Russian organized crime should serve as a laboratory within which the basic features of organized crime reveal themselves. These features and characteristics are basic to its nature, and although historical and cultural factors exert their influence and create some differences in the countries in which organized crime exists, the essence or basic characteristics of organized crime are inherent to its nature.

As we read the literature on organized crime in Russia, both scholars and journalists seem to agree that Russian organized crime is not like the Mafia in the United States. What this comparison means precisely is hard to discern, particularly wlien some authors refer to organized criminals in Russia as "the Russian Mafia." But this usage is at the core of our discussion; that is, the term Mafia has become a synonym for organized crime. This contusion emerged as a result of the indiscriminate use of the term Mafia among American scholars and journalists. In Albini's pioneering work The American Mafia (1971), the argument was made that there never was a secret criminal society called "Mafia," either in Sicily (its supposed country of origin) or in the United States (the country of its supposed exportation). If we correctly understand its origin in Sicily, the Mafia was not and is not one organization, but rather, the term is better understood as a method or modus operand! of a criminal endeavor that has the following three components (Albini, 1971, p. 88):

1. The use of force, intimidation, or threats of such

2. The structure of" a group whose purpose is that of providing illicit services through the use of secrecy on the part of its associates

3. The assurance of political protection from the legal structure tliat is necessary lor its continuous operation

As a method, then, Mafia can exist anywhere. As for its being exported or imported, we should understand that organized criminals migrate;

the system and the criminals' ability to employ it in any given country, by contrast, depends on the social conditions and social system of that country, which may either foster its use or stifle its development. Thus, as has been noted (Albini, 1992, p. 87), it is argued that the Sicilian Mafia migrated to the United States during 1870 to 1920. During the same time, an equally large migration of Italians to Brazil and Argentina took place; yet, Delia Cava( 1977, p. 197) notes, "not only are Italians and their descendants rarely associated with professional criminality, in either country, but also 'organized crime' itself exists on a greatly reduced scale." So, too, as Albini (1986) has noted in his study of organized crime in Great Britain, Italians are virtually nonexistent as a major force in organized crime activity.

Contrary to popular Mafia lore, specific ethnic groups do not create or determine whether Mafia will exist; rather, the existence of social, economic, and historical factors in each society set the stage for its emergence and success. Thus, in the history of the United States, virtually every ethic group lies been found to live had members that participated in organized crime. Their method has always been the same. Yet, because of a need for mythological belief, the Sicilian Mafia has caused the word Mafia to become a synonym; it can be a synonym, but not one for referring to a secret criminal organization-rather, for what is a method of organized criminal activity.

So, as we move toward understanding the nature of organized crime in Russia, the Russian experience allows us and forces us, if we truly wi.sli to understand its reality and the reality of organized crime in any oilier country, to apply clear and useful distinctions to the term organized crime.

THE NEED FOR A SPECIFIC DEFINITION

As one reads the scant literature (Abadinsky, 1992, pp. 264-165; Kenny & Finckenauer, 1995, p. 276) on Russian organized crime, particularly that in (lie United States, one immediately notes confusion regarding whether Russian organized crime is, in fact, organized crime, whether it is a form of Mafia, how it is structured, and a variety of other elements. By contrast, Lydia Rosner (1986) presents a more useful portrait of (lie Russian immigrant and Russian organized crime in the United States by examining llii.s immigrant group's value system regarding how it relates to crime in Russia and then by examining the adaptations these immigrants have made regarding criminal activity in the United States.

Once again, we stress that Mafia as a method is dependent for its effective development on the social setting in which it exists far more than it is on tlie structure or organization of tlie groups that engage in it. We can stress (lie logic behind (his observation by simply asking, "Has any etiinic, racial, or other type of group, irrespective of its organizational structure, not been successful in its involvement with organized criminal activity in tlie United States?" The Irish, Poles, Germans, Japanese, Chinese, motorcycle gangs. Jamaicans, prison gangs, Cubans, Colombians, Mexicans, tlie Black Guerrilla "family," and the Aryan Brotherhood are just a few we mention, but the list goes on. Why does it go on? Because tlie United States is the land of opportunity for success in organized crime. U.S. society, with its historically changing but ever-present needs and demands for illicit goods and a public that lias hidden under aguise of morality, has set up a system in which great financial wealth can be made. This wealth can be acquired, providing that one wishes to take the risk of possible imprisonment or death or botli and lias tlie ingenuity by which to provide some form of political protection for one's criminal enterprise through favors for their protectors or by simply giving them direct payoffs.

This is the American way of crime. The mythology of the "Sicilian Mafia" has been just that-a mythology.

The Sicilians have been no different from any oilier group in tlieir modus opcrandi or structure in terms of achieving success at organized criminal ventures in America. For the past three decades, tlicy simply became the show that America watched in an effort to convince itself that the real threat of organized crime lies from outside its boundaries in (lie form of an invasion of foreigners and their mystical secret society. Social and political systems allow for the creation of organized crime. That is a fact. And so tlie Russian social system in the past and particularly since the collapse of the Berlin Wall lias laid tlie breeding grounds for organized crime to flourish in Russia. That, too, is a fact. As we demonstrate, the Russians are no more or less moral than Americans. In fact, as we show, American and Russian patterns of organized crime are, in many respects, similar. Their differences emerge only as those influenced by such factors as historical development and tlie rapidity of the economic, political, and social changes ttiat occurred in Russia at (lie turn of tilis decade. Along witli those found in America, there are similarities between the Russian patterns and structure of organized crime and those found in the liistory and development of organized crime in Sicily.

DEFINITION AND STRUCTURE

The basic problem with the literature that grapples with the question of whether Russian organized crime in America and Russia is really organized crime, we believe, comes from (lie mistaken need for writers to continue to emphasize the structure of criminal groups more than tlieir function. No one makes tilis point more succinctly than Souther-land and Potter (I993, p. 264). Speaking to tlie structure and function of criminal groups, they conclude:

The empirical evidence suggcsis (hat criminal enterprises arc small, centralized organizations with short hierarchies, little specialization, and unwritten formalizalion based on socialization. The logic of the situation based on organization structure theory dcrnonslrales how unlikely it is that a very large lightly controlled and organized criminal conspiracy could function in operational reality.

A monopolistic syndicate by definition would have an extremely laige iiuinhel of'einployccsand numerous functional specialties such as drugs, prostitution, gambling and loansharking. To achieve its goals, the syndicate would have to provide constant instruction and information to street-level purveyors. It would liavc to monitor employee pciTormance, keep careful records, and engage in considerable discussion about specific plans. These behaviors would imperil the very existence ol'thc organization. II such a conspiracy existed, removing its leadership would cripple tlie enterprise. Experience demonstrates llial this has not happened despite extensive successful prosecutions of prominent organized crime figures.

We are in agreement with Southerland and Potter and think it would be more productive to study (lie functions of organized crime groups because tlic structure is assuredly based on that function. Many writers, it seems, are so influenced by a belief in a conspiratorial model of criminal enterprises that they go searching for large, complexly structured groups of participants. In doing so, they miss (lie trees for the forest. As we observe Russian organized crime, we find that, like American organized crime, the function-that is, what the criminals arc trying to accomplish in terms of goals-definitely influences the structure. Therefore, in our search and discussion, we find it productive to employ Albini's (1971, cliap. 2) classification of the four major forms of organized crime:

I. Political-social organized crime: The goal is not direct financial profit or the changing or maintaining of the existing political-social structure. An example ol'lhis is terrorism or llic Ku Klux Klan. '

2. Mercenary organized crime: The goal is the attainment of direct financial profit. Included are racketeering, extortion, organized tlicfl of goods, confidence games, and other forms of profit-oriented crimes.

3. In-group organized crime: Financial gain is not the direct goal, but instead Ihc purpose lies ill the individual's psychological and social gratification of belonging to a group that engages in deviant and criminal activity. Included here are the hedonistic or violent gangs lliat engage in thrills or violence hut do so lor the adventure itself Examples ol'this are tlic adolescent and street-corner gangs, found in most cities, tliat frequently engage in street fights over territory, or "rumbles."

4. Syndicated organized crime: The goal is to attain direct financial gain by providing illicit goods or services or holli through the use of llncals or violence and by attaining forms of police or political "protection" that will safeguard the criminal from legal interference. Examples arc gambling, prostitution, and drug syndicates.

The reader will note that each of these forms ol criminal activity lias a different goal and tliat (lie structures and size of the group will vary, depending on the structural and personnel differences required in the achievement of eacli goal. The confusion tliat so often occurs in tlic literature arises from the fact that many authors use (lie term Main to describe organized criminal activity tliat is mercenary or political-social in nature. Tlie term Mafia, if it is used properly to describe a method, is really correctly used only when it refers to syndicated crime. But even here, because the term has become so indiscriminately, erroneously, and randomly used, we advocate tliat it not be used (because ol tlic misunderstanding its use creates). Instead, we prefer and use the term syndicated crime.

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: A TRADITION

As we move now to tlic analysis and description of Russian organized crime, we do so within a theoretical background that views its development from a historical and social perspective.

To argue that Russian organized crime is a current phenomenon is to miss its existence within Soviet society in the past.

To say, however, that it is not a current phenomenon is to fail to understand that the breakdown and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened new roads and new opportunities for organized criminal ventures to develop within Russia itself and to reach out across international boundaries. This phenomenon has become so pronounced that the Russian government has appealed for international help from legal agencies in its fight against organized crime (Las Vegas Review Journal, 1994). So, too, because Russian organized crime is now viewed both by the American public and by American law enforcement agencies as part of America's growing crime problem, we present our discussion in the context of comparing the Russian and American experience. Also, as we noted earlier, because Russian organized crime manifests a profile of emerging from the rapidity and abruptness of swift historical and societal change, it serves as a laboratory of social-scientific research. Also, we believe that because of the confusion concerning the nature of the Mafia in Sicily, it will be of heuristic value to the international study of organized crime to compare the similarities and differences of syndicated criminal development in Russia and Sicily. Indeed, there are many similarities along with drastic differences.

Let's move on, then, to the investigation and understanding of this complex, multivariable, social-cultural phenomenon known as organized crime.

As we stated before, to say that Russian organized crime is a new phenomenon is to miss a major lesson learned from the Russian experience-mainly, that although totalitarian political systems can control most aspects of social life, they cannot totally control all of them. So as V. L. Dedenkov (cited in Shabalin, Albini, & Rogers, 1990, pp. 5-6) notes, following the Russian Revolution, a variety of criminal groups or organizations appeared that have been given the name "thieves within the code." These groups varied in size, had a leader, and had rules of behavior for their members, one of the major rules being that members not become involved in politics. It is difficult to construct an accurate profile of these organizations because one of their major features was secrecy. Sterling (1994b, p. 47), citing the work of the Russian poet and ex-thief Mikhail Dyomin, notes that such organizations date back to the 1600s. However, Sterling seems to agree with Dyomin that these were organized on the model of the Sicilian Mafia. At this point, we should note that both Sterling's and Dyomin's arguments are based on an erroneous confusion: that of viewing Mafia, the so-called Sicilian secret society, with other Sicilian criminal groups known as "Frattellanze" or "brotherhoods." Mafia, as we define it as a method, could not and did not emerge in Sicily until 1860, when the institution of universal suffrage provided the third component of what constitutes syndicated crime or Mafia as method-political protection (Albini, 1971,p.127).

These brotherhoods arose in the 1700s to fight the Bourbons, whose rule began in 1738. The frequent mythological and erroneous belief that the Mafia in Sicily began as a benevolent organization to fight the French oppressive government is born here. These brotherhoods, as Antonino Cutrera (cited in Albini, 1971, p. 114) states, though they stressed secrecy and each was organized and had a leader, were organized, not for noble purposes, but instead to make profits from theft and extortion. As such, they seem to have had the same structure and function as the thieves within the code. We argue, then, that the thieves within the code in Russia, from the scant information we have regarding them, were, at least during the early years of Soviet Security Police and later Stalinist repression from 1920 until 1950, at most, criminal organizations that engaged in mercenary, not syndicated, crime. Later, particularly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, some of these thieves-within-the-code groups did begin engaging in forms of syndicated crime.

The 1920s saw a struggle for power among different factions in the Communist Party; it was especially intense after the death of Lenin in 1924, By 1928, Stalin had eliminated the opposition and ruled with an iron fist until his death in March 1953. The Stalinist era was from 1928 to 1953.

In reference to the organized criminality of the thieves within the code and of organized crime in general in Russia during the communist era, officially the Soviet government took the position that such activity was a product of a capitalistic system and therefore could not exist in a socialist society (Shabalin et al., 1990, p. 1). Hence, any information regarding evidence or allegations of its existence was flagrantly suppressed to the point that when KGB and military personnel themselves reported such activities, they were simply told, "There is no organized crime in the Soviet Union." We should also add that, during this era, the majority of crimes for which people were arrested, such as those arrests resulting from the purges of the 1930s, were politically motivated and viewed as crimes against the state (Shabalin etal., 1990, p. 6).

Although there is nebulousness about the nature of organized crime groups in Russia before the revolution and in the postrevolutionary 1920s and Stalinist era, this nebulousness begins to clear as we move into the 1950s. The current, mistaken, but prevalent belief is that, in Russia, organized crime in its contemporary forms did not exist until the tearing down of the Iron Curtain or, put another way, that Russian organized crime first appeared as a result of glasnost and perestroika.

Rosner (1993) is quick to counter this point of view, and we agree with her that various forms of Russian mercenary and syndicated crime were in existence even though they were being hidden by the Iron Curtain. In fact, we would argue that the current forms of mercenary and some forms of syndicated crime began appearing and evolving in complexity by the end of the 1950s and flourished during the period of stagnation-the label given to the period of rule of the Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev (1964-82) (Shabalin etal., 1990, p. 7). This period is important to our later discussion of the development of various forms of organized crime. During this time, the breeding grounds for the development of organized crime emerged when capital investment was allocated to the military in an effort to gain missile parity with the United States, all at the expense and sacrifice to the Soviet people's standard of living (Shabalin et al., 1990, p. 7).

Konstantin Simis, writing in 1982, had already labeled the U.S.S.R. the "corrupt society" and stated then that both "the Soviet state and society alike [were] rotten with corruption from top to bottom" (p. 179). To say that organized crime in Russia is a new phenomenon, then, is to miss the role of its historical development since the 1950s and the changes in the political, economic, and social system of Russia and its republics during the era of stagnation.

Nonetheless, we must make an important distinction between the era before and the era after the breakdown and breakup of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991: That is, prior to this period, organized crime in the Soviet Union focused primarily on enterprises within its political and territorial boundaries; after the fall, it extended its enterprises and boundaries to international markets and territories.

When Eastern Europe broke away from communist control in 1989, it had a profound effect on the Soviet Union. Many nationalists wanted independence for their republics. During that same year, the Communist Party competed with other parties for seats in the new Duma (Parliament). When the military and the KGB failed in the August 19-21, 1991, coup, Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). He also outlawed the Communist Party (it later became legal under a different name) and seized its assets of more than 3 billion rubles.

To understand organized crime in Russia during both periods, we must examine the nature of its origins within the cultural and historical development of the Soviet Union itself. For within the values of this culture juxtaposed and in conjunction with the economic, political, and other aspects of Soviet society, this form of criminality took root. After its various types had developed and its various groups formed, its exportation into other countries and the nature of these exported forms of criminality became dependent on the social, economic, and political environment of those countries into which they were exported and on the demand for illegal goods and services that existed in the global marketplace. We are liere trying to emphasize the distinction between (lie phenomenon of a criminal system that develops within a society generated by individuals born and raised in that society and their individual participation in similar forms of that criminality outside that system. Thus, although Mafia as a method developed and exists in Sicily, it is a composite of the Sicilian life and culture of Sicily. If Sicilians who participated in that system came to the United States, as some of them did, it is not the Mafia that is transported. A cultural system, as such, cannot be transported; instead, individuals migrate and bring with them their criminal values and techniques. Ultimately, however, whether such criminals are successful in effectively instituting these criminal enterprises in their country of destination depends on tlie amenability of the social system of that country to foster such development.

By contrast, criminal groups or criminal secret societies with a particular modus operandi could migrate to a foreign country as a group. If their style of criminality is new to that country, then we can speak of these groups as having exported a new form of crime. If, however, that form of criminality already exists witliin the country they enter, we can hardly refer to these criminals as having exported it into that country. In either respect, as we noted, whether tliese groups are successful in implementing their criminal operation depends on the social, economic, political, and other conditions of the country into which they migrate.

We make the above distinctions because, in the literature concerning organized crime, particularly that of Russian organized crime, we so often note the use of the term export in the discussion of what are described as new forms of organized crime in the United States and other countries. A major illustration of this is witnessed in the argument that has become a part of U.S. folklore-mainly, that the Sicilians "exported" the Mafia to the United States. His tory shows us that Mafia as a method existed in America as early as tlic time of (lie Civil War, long before the conditions surrounding the Prohibition Era in the 1920s allowed the Sicilians and many other ethnic groups to take their turn at engaging in a pattern of crime- syndicated crime-that is as American in origin as apple pie.

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: AFTER THE BREAKUP

It is true that many changes in the types of organized criminal enterprises and the organizations of the groups operating them took place after the fall of communism in 19S9-1991. But to argue lhat the fall created this surge in Russian criminality is to miss the realities of what was occurring in Russia before Ilie coming of fflasno'st and perestroika. Rosner (1993) makes this point succinctly in tlie title of her article- "Crime and Corruption in Russia Are Nothing New." We agree witli her lhat the seeds of what has grown to become the formulation of criminal groups that now threaten international peace and safety through the terror of the potential sale of nuclear material (Time, 1994b) were sown in the very system of communism and its inherent and absolute policy of the state owning all goods and services. In the reports of recent conferences and seminars held in Russia, Professor V. Shabalin and A. I. Dolgova and various other social scientists, government representatives, and lawyers have noted that the current practice of bribery and corruption certainly existed during the time of the czars and historically have been an embedded part of the very nature of Russian society. Indeed, N. G. Chemyskevsky speaks of Russia as a land "rich in bribe takers since time immemorial" (Shabalin et al., 1990, p. 18).

Our purpose here is not to degrade or pass judgment on Russian society or its people; most Russians are honest citizens. Instead, we wish to observe, analyze, and discuss a way of life that Rosner (1986) refers to in the title of her book as The Soviet Way of Crime. This system incorporates a cultural way ol'social interaction, brought about by political and economic restrictions, that lias come to constitute the arena of life in Russia for most of tlie 20th century.

THE PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

It is a way of life anil crime that arises out of needs, values, and social interaction patterns that can be understood only within the web of a historical development and social structure unique to Russia. This does not mean that there are no similarities to other cultures. Indeed, one could argue that, in the way of crime, Russia has several historical-social patterns tliat are similar to those of Sicily. But history and social forces do not form societies so tliat they arc identical; hence, the differences far exceed tlie similarities. Yet, in tlie social potential for the development of syndicated crime, tlie people of Russia and of Sicily definitely have one feature in common: They both liave a distrust of government and governmental power. Sicilians developed this distrust because of tlie many and rapid foreign invasions during which the conquerors took over tlie land, took wliat they needed, and either left or were forced to leave by cultural revolutions or other foreign invaders. Under such conditions, one learns to rely on family and communal ties as resources for sustaining life and human relationships, as opposed to relying on the typically unfulfilled promises of central governments. In Russia, governments under both the rule of the czar and that of the communist state represented totalitarianisin in one form or another where individual freedom was suppressed. As such, like the invading foreigners of Sicily, tlie internal governmental system of Russia lias made (lie Russians, like tlie Sicilians, distrustful of government.

This common historical inheritance in both Sicily and Russia has produced a melliod of social interaction in which patrons and clients become the basic social format for interaction.

The terms patron and client describe power relationships that gain their meaning only within the context of social interaction. This power is not formalized in the legal system, nor is it cstablislicd by conventionally prescribed rules. Yet, it lies at the basis of interaction, buth legal and illegal, in both Russian and Sicilian society. To describe these terms, we turn to tlie work ofJeremy Boissevain (1966, p. 18), who defines a patron as any person in a position of power and influence and who tliereby can help or protect others not in that position. The client, by contrast, is the person who seeks and receives the assistance and protection for which he or she, in return, offers services to the patron. Eric Wolf (1966, pp. 16-17) further elaborates on tlie description by noting that no two functionaries in a patron-client relationship are equal. He also notes that patrons and clients can engage in hotli legal and illegal actions in wliich tlie patron provides assistance and protection, with the client returning the favor by being loyal to the patron, giving political support, and providing tlie patron witli information that is vital to his or her personal and social welfare.

Patron-clieiil relationships arc not governed by legal norms, but instead are based on social norms in which there is an accepted faith between tlie two participants that each will carry out Ilis or lier end of tlie bargain. Most important, the power relations between patrons and clients arc constantly in a slate of change so that a patron at one time or in one situation may later become the client of his or her original client. So, too, a patron, while serving as such to a client, may liini- oiTiersell simultaneously serve as a client to another patron.

Thus, the patron-client relationship must be understood as a system of interaction taking place at and between various levels of social strata and involving constantly changing power positions.

The nature of patron-client relationships varies from society to society, but in Sicily and Russia, the system operates to form networks of relationships in wliicli (lie more clients a patron lias, (lie more power the patron gains from favors he or she can request. This power is enhanced further by (lie vital information tlie patron obtains; in turn, the more patrons a client has, the more Russian Organized Crime power he or she obtains from the protection and service llic client can receive. As such, it is a inulually reinforcing system in which, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, it serves both parties to cooperate and help one another. As such, both parlies can gain and retain power.

Because of the distrust of government in both Sicily and Russia and (lie development of the patron-client system of interaction, the breeding grounds for syndicated organized crime were entrenched in both social systems. In Sicily, the catalyst for the development of Mafia as a method resulted from ownership of land in the gabel-lotlo. or landlord system, which developed following (lie abolition and breakdown of the feudal system in l812(seeAlbini, 1971, chap. 4). These landlords slowly established themselves in (lie social structure by developing patron-client relationships in which they could offer services, legal and illegal, to a variety of clients. In time, they liired men skilled in (lie use of violence, and through time, the landlords threatened and employed violence against (liosc wlio opposed tlicin. Finally, vvlicn llaly obtained universal suffrage, the landlord could now provide votes for government officials who, in turn, if elected, would be in a position to offer (lie landlord and all his clients protection from the law.

In Russia, the catalyst was not land as land, and its tenure under (he c/.ars never liad or took the format of Sicily's gabellotto. Hence, the criminal activity described during that era and Following (lie early days of communist rule as lliieves within the code or bands of thieves organized around the major clement of secrecy was primarily tliat constituting forms of mercenary crime. These groups stole for financial gain or profit but had no political protection. It remained to the days of (lie lull development of tlie communist state, to the development of the political and economic system of tlie 1960s Soviet society, for syndicated crime to emerge as a pattern that took hold and continues today. There is no doubt that perestroika and glasnost exerted their influence in the direction and volume of syndicated crime, but the system of the patron-client way of crime in the Soviet Union was already alive and doing well before these political programs were introduced.

What land was to the spawning of syndicated crime in Sicily in the 1860s, state-owned goods and services were to become in the Russia of the 1960s, the bartering ingredient that generated the development of Russian syndicated crime. By contrast with Russia and Sicily, in the United States, where syndicated crime lias existed as early as the 1860s, it was and continues to be Americans' desire for illegal goods and services that historically has created the many criminal syndicates tliat procure political protection and tlireaten and use violence to make such goods available.

Organized crime, then, particularly syndicated crime, is a complex phenomenon. The structure of the groups tliat engage in it reveals many variations; tlius, ethnicity, kinship, business, and otiicr bases for organization and cooperation appear and vary in the societies in which syndicated crime exists. Indeed, in contrast with (lie belief in a large, centralized, bureaucratic format of syndicate structure, research reveals (lie opposite: Structures small in tlie number of functionaries, witli continually changing involvement of personnel and power relationships and constantly changing webs of networks and enterprises, are tlie features tliat make this form of criminality the menace that it is. It is not (lie secrecy in which these groups conduct those enterprises, for the practice of secrecy is a natural ingredient to all criminal enterprises. Nor is it the largeness of the group tliat sustains such enterprises, for largeness would hamper rather than aid their effective functioning. Instead, tlie existence of many small syndicates, with their multitude of network patron-client relationships and the demand for tlieir goods and services, gives syndicated criminals their strength and persistence in societies that allow them to function. At the end of tlie argument concerning its existence lies the reality tliat societies, not individuals, create the basis for syndicated organized crime.

SYNDICATE CRIME IN A STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMY

The basic source of syndicated crime in Russia arises, as Rosner (1993) explains, in the fact (liat, in (lie Soviet Union, all goods and services were owned by the state. As such, theoretically, there could be no private enterprise. We say "theoretically" because, in reality, there was a way, (lie Soviet way of crime: That way was to steal goods from the state or illegally barter for the performance of services in a manner that, like theft, would have been considered a crime against the state.

The state, of course, was caught in a dilemma: It needed to provide goods and services to its populace, but it was also concerned about developing and keeping its military strength equal, if not superior, to that of its (lien adversary tlie United States. In the 1960s, particularly under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, most capital investment was diverted into the science and military establishment in an effort to counteract llic new U.S. threat of missile development. In doing so, tlie stale seriously reduced the production and supply of goods and services that constituted the basic necessities for life and comfort among the general population. As a result, a black market for all goods and services emerged.

This condition was further complicated by the political reality of what Simis (1982, pp. 2, 27) calls "(lie dual system of government" that existed at that time-that is, the bodies of government such as the Council of Ministers and other agencies empowered to govern by the constitution, alongside tlie Communist Party, which is not even mentioned in the constitution, yet became tlie real ruling body of tlie Soviet Union. As Simis further explains, because the state, which owned all goods and services and was the sole employer of (lie population, was subject to the Communist Party's decisions, this translated into the party really being the sole controller of all aspects of Soviet life.

And so, it seems that when shortages in goods and services were created by the state's allocations of money for military purposes in the 1960s, the Soviet citizens at all levels began to create their own manner of obtaining the goods and services that often constituted the basic necessities of life or that made living easier and more pleasant.

Lev Timofeyev (1990, p. 58), a Russian critic of the Soviet regime, puts this reaction on the part of Soviet citizens very succinctly when he observes: "No violence or brainwashing, however intensive, could make man forego tlie basic relations of supply and demand. Apparently, nature has not provided any other mechanism for supporting tlie social life of Homo sapiens."

And so the shortage brought into action the use of patron-client relationship. As Rosner (1993, p. I) describes it, Thus a state employee could find work doing private repair jobs for lliosc who could pay him with meat or clothing stolen from their jobs. The slate employee had to obtain his supplies from a network of "friends" whose favors he rewarded will) I'avors olTii.s own. A stale cement truck driver would exchange sonic ccmciil. delivered ID ;i pli-valc job, lor some eoats for lii.s children. Л stale clerk in an automobile licensing agency would exchange the right lo drive a motor vehicle lor gasoline for his own use or sale.

As Lev Timofeyev (1990, p. 58) notes further, "Everything is bought and sold in this country. Everything including the official positions in the Communist Party."

And Rosner (1993, p. I) adds to Timofeyev's observation by noting that further alienation from the central government took place as tlie national organization in tlie republics themselves became totally corrupt, the people in charge staying in power and increasing tlieir power by granting and exchanging political lavors as well as employing private procurers in order to obtain all types of goods and services.

Syndicated crime, as a form, existed at this time because it is difficult to distinguish the criminals from the political protectors. Because many people, if they could, were stealing goods from the state and wheeling and dealing in tlie game of exchanging goods and services, it is ludicrous to argue that criminal syndicates were established to provide illicit goods to those who desired them. Why? Because this entire system of citizens and government agents obtaining goods and services was so widespread as to have become itself the social norm. So, too, violence, though it seems to have occurred in the form that Rosner (1986, p. 9) mentions as the use of violent force by "thugs" working for corrupt district party members, was not, during this time period, a pronounced feature of this system or the Soviet way of crime. Ironically, and further confusing the issue of the existence of syndicated crime, during this era of communist rule, as Timofeyev (1990, pp. 56-57) notes, any entrepreneurial activity, whether engaged in by criminal groups or honest businesspeople, was by definition considered illegal and punishable by law. But because so many government officials were themselves engaging in corrupt practices, it is difficult not to argue that the government itself consisted of a form of organized crime. For if the corrupter is simultaneously the corrupted, where are the boundaries for establishing the definition and essence of the legal system?

It seems, then, that the period prior to the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union became the training and breeding ground for the development of syndicated crime in contemporary Russia. Up to that time, the criminality-if one can call it that, considering the fact that stealing from the state and the rampant exchanging of goods and services among Soviet citizens had become the social norm-was, for the most part, contained within the Soviet Union. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the movement toward the development of a market economy and the privatization of business and industry, the former Soviet Union experienced one of the most rapid and tumultuous changes in the history of social change.

The breeding and training grounds now having been established, Russia and its republics were a ripe market for the development of an international market of criminal ventures. And so, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this Soviet way of crime extended its boundaries and developed its various forms of contemporary organized crime, including the clear development of syndicated organized crime.

The picture of the contemporary scene in Russia is best painted by the 1993 U.S. News & World Report article most timely entitled "Focus on Change" (1994, p. 17). The report reads:

The former Soviet Union is a cauldron of contrasts. It is now 15 separate countries, the sum of the new parts much less than the old whole. Russia dominates, undeniably weakened; its military is dispirited and underfunded, its economy in a steepening plunge, its political reform stalemated. But it is also strong. Its arsenal of 30,000 nuclear weapons is intact; it has vast reserves of natural resources, a solid labor base and a growing entrepreneurial class. In Russia and the other new states, many younger leaders haven't abandoned hopes of radically reforming political systems.

This report then describes the current process of converting the military and defense industry into civilian production by using the Russian term konvulsiya ("convulsion"; p. 17); and, indeed, convulsion is probably the best word for describing the entire current social system of Russia and the federation. In a state of convulsion, the human body loses equilibrium. Convulsing political units do the same.

ECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM AND ORGANIZED CRIME

We use the analogy of disequilibrium because Russia and its former republics are caught in a web of contradictory and conflicting political and social forces often serving to frustrate and block the desperately needed move toward a unified and cooperative approach toward the resolution of economic and other problems.

This situation is a perfect setting for the proliferation of crime, particularly organized crime. As the movement and changes geared toward privatization began to emerge slowly in 1989 and 1990, the forces-business, political, and criminal-of the old and the new power groups began to clash. Young entrepreneurs who honestly believed that a private and free economy was the new mode of doing business did, in fact, begin creating business enterprises. At first, it seems that the old-time Communist bureaucrats simply expected these young business people to fail because these bureaucrats believed that any capitalistic venture, by its very nature, could not succeed. When these bureaucrats saw that these entrepreneurs could and were becoming successful, however, they either used their legal power and the law itself to arrest them, often as Timofeyev (1990, pp. 58-59) notes, labeling them as "Mafia-profiteers" or, recognizing that there was gold in those capitalistic hills, decided to join them and allow the capitalistic system to work for them.

And so privatization, definitely established as an economic program in 1992, became, as Rosner (1993, p. 2) puts it, "the ultimate shakeout of a bureaucratically corrupt system." But with privatization, llie world, not just Russia and its federation, became the stage on wliicli the current drama of Russian organized crime would be enacted.

Internally, tlie breakdown of the Soviet Union sounded the bell for various republics to demand or fight or both for independence. A look at the military operations of the Russian special forces reveals that, since 1989, political-social organized crime became: concern for the new Russia. In 1989, political unrest demanded military intervention in Uzbekistan. In the spring of 1990, ethnic unrest in the trans-Caucasian republics demanded Russia's military action. Indeed, May and June 1992 saw political upheavals in the form of riots, protests, civil war, terrorism, and other forms of political-social criminality in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Dagestan, 'these and the continued conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nogorno-Karabakh created a continuing sequence of criminal acts of a political-social nature. Jim Short(1993), who has trained KGB personnel and police and security forces in the Baltic states before, as well as after, independence, cites numerous cases of terrorism and other forms of social-political organized crime. What is interesting about Short's description and analysis of these political-social actions is his mention of the involvement of Russian "Mafia" functionaries. Quick to note that, in Russia, Mafia is a generic term for racketeers, black marketeers, and gangsters (p. 39), Short mentions that these criminal gangs were frequently employed to help the cause of interior ministers in various former republics. As such, Short notes, in Latvia, in March 1992, a criminal group went to the extent of disguising themselves as members of a military unit by wearing the Russian military red beret and camouflage. These groups, as Short observes (p. 27), disguised as official Russian special units, were actually paid criminals whose task was to protect and facilitate the escape of other criminals in the event of attack by authentic Russian forces.

MERCENARY CRIME: THE NEW ROBBER BARONS

Probably the most voluminous form of organized criminality ushered in by the breakup of the U.S.S.R. and the movement toward privatization lies in the category of mercenary crime. For here, the goal is not the seeking or retaining of political power, but outright profit itself.

Russian research (Shabalin et al., 1990, p. 7) finds a direct relationship between the growth of contemporary organized crime and the improvement of the economic system. Russian students of the topic agree that "the level of organized crime is closely associated with the state of the economy" and that "within the economy is hidden the nucleus of the criminal corporation."

We note once again that the breeding grounds for the growth of organized crime and the accompanying patron-client system of social interaction necessary for its development were already intact prior to the coming of privatization; one, then, can readily understand that when the economic gates were open, a flood of criminal ventures began to flow through Russia, its former republics, and the world. This growth has brought to the foreground a term that has come to be widely used in (lie discussion of contemporary Russian organized crime-"the shadow economy"-and rightly so, for within the context of this economic system, organized crime seems to have increased in both types and number of enterprises, as well as its extension into international markets.

But we must note that the shadow economy and its frequently employed synonym, "the black market," has its roots in the past social patterns of Soviet society. Its evolution into contemporary forms spawned by criminals must be viewed from the perspective of a system where, formally, all goods and services were owned by the state to one slowly trying to change to a system of individual entrepreneurs. We define shadow economy as "the entire complex of non-accounted, non-regulated and illegal types of economic activities (different from normative documents and rules of the economy)" (Sliabalin et al" 1990, p. 12).

But, in offering this definition, we heed the words of Lev Tiniofcyev (1990, p. 59), who reminds us that the entire Soviet economy has been nothing else but an "enormous 'black market' of goods, services, official positions and privileges." Timofeyev also answers the question of why the black market nonetheless has helped create the current growth and expansion of organized criminality. He explains:

The chief drawback of (he Soviet black market in comparison to the I'rcc market is that in the former the profit is not genuine capital, it cannot be used for investment, for expanding production and improving productivity. Untaxcd cash acquired in Illis market is typically used for personal consumption or converted into gold and valuables which in the recent period arc increasingly apt to be taken out of the country via illegal routes. (p. 56) This practice casts the shadow of criminality across Russia, and the shadow it casts takes many forms.

Paul Klebnikov, writing in Forhes magazine (1994a, pp. 74-84), compares current Russia with that era of tlie robber barons in America during which the robber barons dominated American capitalism. Men like Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, and others gained control of huge assets, not through theft, but through tlieir organizational skills and financial leverage. Klebnikov then describes several Russian businessmen who have become wealthy. It is here worthwhile, for the purpose of our discussion, to note briefly the description of how one of these men became successful because it illustrates our point that the old political-economic system in Russia has blended with the new. Klebnikov writes about Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman of Menatep Bank, a Russian bank with close to $1 billion: His first financial backing came from one of the communist-conlrollcd district councils of Moscow. Later, Khodorkovsky apparently bought out the district council. Now this swarthy young man runs a vast conglomerate. It includes Menatep Bank, a dozen other hanks, Moscow real cslalc, a steel mill. one of Russia's hnycsl produccis of titanium as well as food processing ;ind chemical companies, (p. 74)

His article goes on to tell how Khodorkovsky lives in luxury but is surrounded by a host of private security guards.

The web of patron-client relationships, apart from allowing for the creation of robber barons, has also allowed for the old and the new to come togetlier in the establishment of a variety of new mercenary organized criminal adventures.

ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES

The fear of nuclear war, spawned by the threat of nuclear missiles falling into the hands of terrorists, has caused concern over organized crime and its involvement in tlie sale ofpluto-nium, as well as nuclear missiles themselves. It is difficult to estimate the extent of such ventures, but (lie fact tliat two attempted illegal sales of radioactive materials were thwarted by Russian police in 1994 and that, since 1991, close to 440 cases of the attempted smuggling of nuclear material into Germany, most being rendered ineffective by sting operations (Time, 1994b, pp. 46-51), makes the possibility of such sales loom as real threats.

In his discussion of the sale of nuclear material, William Burrows (1994, pp. 54-55) states the reality surrounding this issue by reminding us that Iraq, Iran, Libya, and other countries would be interested in purchasing plutonium. With such a demand, the possibility always exists that both lone freelancers and criminal syndicates in Russia or one of its former republics may serve as the avenue for establishing and facilitating these connections. Obviously, the sale could come from some scientist or official who has access to such material, or organized criminals could bribe the source of access to obtain the nuclear material and arrange for its sale.

A great danger is posed by the conversion of the Russian army as an object of the activities of criminal associations. These associations have the following aims: Procurement of valuable raw materials

Acquisition of technology for next to nothing Control over the sale of military technology abroad

Use of army transportation capabilities for illegal сonveyance Seizure of various types of weapons Recruitment of discharged servicemen into subunits for guarding criminal structures

So, too, organized crime leaders attempt to corrupt and infiltrate special military detachments such as the Russian Cossacks and other elite units entrusted with guarding military supply depots in an effort to attain weapons and nuclear and other valuable materials.

In contrast with the questionable sale of nuclear material, Louise Shelley (1994), testifying before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, alerts us to the large illicit trade in military equipment, which is alarming because it is helping support armed conflicts within the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world. This information that Shelley cites is given credence by the recent scandal and accusations against Russian Defense Minister Paval Grachev (Time, 1994с, pp. 80-81), who, in answering accusations from the Russian Parliament, accused the Parliament of being the real culprit because it controls the purse strings. In either respect, the scandal surrounds the illegal sale of military property in Germany.

According to an article by Seymour Hersh (1994, p. 75), 60kg of highly enriched uranium were seized by the Russian Ministry of Security in April 1994 at Izhevala, Russia; 20 people were arrested and charged with smuggling. Hersh also argues the possibility (p. 76) that Russian scientists, because of the loss of the basic necessities of life-housing, health care, and regular paychecks-may be leaving the country and trading not only their scientific knowledge but also high-tech weapons components. Hersh does note that the Department of Energy believes there is no evidence that nuclear weapons or materials have been exported from the Soviet Union (p. 75). However, there is always the possibility, as Claire Sterling (1994b, p. 215) suggests, that nuclear sales outside Russia and its republics have been made, but the reason the world does not know about such sales is that "a solid wall of secret agents ... blocks the view." It does appear that there is a legitimate concern in Russia and one of its republics-Kazakhstan-over the control and export of nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists when we saw recently that 1,300 Ib of uranium stored in Kazakhstan, which evidently Saddam Hussein was desperately trying to obtain, went instead to the United States and is now safely stored in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (rime, 1994с, pp. 38-39).

We should note that, legitimately, Russia, to the tune of $2.2 billion in 1992 alone, has been aggressively selling weapons to India, China, Syria, Iran, and other countries in its effort to convert industrial defense production into civilian production. Unfortunately, the fact that the Russian government cannot offer long-term support and service for its technologically complex weapons has not made this the effective conversion finance-raising solution it was intended to be ("Focus on Change," 1994). No doubt, however, the demand for tliese weapons will allow criminal groups to continue the illicit sale of such weapons to those countries or groups that, even though the continued servicing of such weapons cannot be guaranteed, will nonetheless purchase them out of dire need.

Along with tliese ventures in Russia and its former republics are other types of mercenary crime. One example is the scams concerning credit and banking violations in which capital made from illicit activities is used in establishing businesses that serve as fronts for illegal transactions. In a sophisticated version of the "long-firm fraud" scheme developed and practiced widely by British criminals (Albini, 1986, pp. 103-104), a Russian criminal group stole $200 million from (lie Russian state in 1992. This scheme, described by Sterling (1994b, pp. IOS-109), entailed the creation of a straw bank in the small republic of Chechnya, which sent Russia's central bank fraudulent or phony "credit advisories" for $200 million, which (lie directors of the straw bank indicated they liad on deposit. The straw bank then asked Moscow for a credit line to import computers. The central bank sent tlie money to a dozen commercial banks in Moscow. When informed thatthecomputer deal liad not gone through, tliese 12 commercial banks simply allowed the cash to be withdrawn and sent back to the straw bank, no questions asked, and minus their cut. Sterling (1994b.chap. 5) also cites numerous other cases of fraudulent business ventures, sometimes involving Americans and other foreigners working in conjunction with Russians, in which petroleum and other goods and materials resulted in the increase of (lie wealth of lliese individuals aiid (lie depletion of (lie Russian economy. In Moscow, in January 1994, a seminar entitled "For Honest Business" was sponsored by (lie Russian Criminological Association.

Here, as Shabalin (1995) notes in his summary of the seminar, material and discussions showed that Russia today has a fast-growing network of commercial banks and stock and currency exchanges that, through illegal investment of funds, arc literally running rampant simply because state control over such activities lias been seriously weakened. This weakness is a result of criminal associations lobbying to influence political decisions and the legislative process itself. According to tlie Analytical Center of the Academy of Sciences of Russia, 35% of capital and 80% of election shares today are transferred into the hands of criminal and foreign capital.

Along with enterprises involving the use of fraud, other organized mercenary criminal enterprises exist in Russia. These typically function as they do in other countries. An example is the enterprise of counterfeiting. Witli the increasing use of sophisticated photocopiers, counterfeiters in many countries are producing bills and transporting them across international boundaries. Some of tliese bills liave already made their way from Iran to the former Soviet Union (U.S. News & World Report, 1994b, p. 79). The widespread use and flow of counterfeit bills in Russia is demonstrated by the case involving tlie kidnapping, in 1993, of a teacher, bus driver, and sclioolcliildicn by criminals in Rostov, Russia. After demanding and receiving the ransom money paid in U.S. currency, the kidnappers made a final demand-that they receive a machine that could distinguish between real and counterfeit bills (U.S. News & World Report, 1994b, p. 73). As we move now into our discussion of the organized protection and extortion forms of organized crime, those typically referred to as "rackets," we use this topic to lead us into our discussion of syndicated crime in Russia. We do this because these forms of rackets, depending on the format they take, can be ol the mercenary or syndicated type.

In one type, the organized perpetrators have no political or police protection. For the most part, (lie "Black Hand" in tlie United States, for example, because it typically did not have political protection, used fear and intimidation by sending letters to Italian immigrants in an effort to extort money from them (Pitkin & Cordasco, 1977).

So, too, currently in New York and other cities, as Kelly et al. (1993) have found, Chinese street gangs in the Chinese communities extort money from Chinese businesspeople. As Kellyetal. nulc(p. 226), these activities persist, not because the criminals liave political or police protection, but rather because, out of fear, the victims refuse to file charges or testify against these criminals. Hence, in Russia, we find criminal gangs that, simply because they are adept at using intimidation and force, work the protection and extortion schemes without police or political protection. Like the Italian and Chinese criminals in tlie United States, these groups rely on the fact that their victims are too tearful to report tlic crime or to serve as witnesses in any legal action taken by the authorities. Typically, when they sell protection to businesses, sucli protection is based on an agreement. Thus, as Arthur Fisher (1994, p. 24) reports, thugs who guard the multitude of street kiosks that sell everything from imported camcorders to video games in Moscow usually offer their services for 20% of the sales.

The protection operation, both in Russia and other countries where it is practiced, often originates out of a symbiotic need created by social conditions. Thus, often, it is not tlie criminal who forces protection on the businesspcrson, but instead the businessperson who, recognizing the need for protection in an environment where theft is so rampant, seeks and agrees to be protected for a price.

In many contemporary protection and extortion schemes in Russia, however, the reality is that many of these rackets have the backing and protection of political or police alliances or both. Recently, organized criminal associations have been subsidizing (lie education of young criminal participants studying law, with the goal of having them later assume positions of power within this legal system, thus further ensuring protection to their criminal enterprises.

Political protection is obtained from either a powerful patron in tlie legal system who grants it in return for money or favors or a political protector who is part of tlie criminal enterprise itself.

Tlius, a minister or high government official can become the protector for a criminal venture or, in many cases, create the criminal venture itself and (lien offer protection to those wlio operate it. In this respect, it would be like the case of John Morrissey (Albini, 1971, pp. 186-189) in the United States, who because of his patronage to Tammany Hall and his support from fellow Irish voters, was elected as a New York state senator, as well as a representative in (lie U.S. Congress. As such, he was able to offer political protection for his own criminal syndicate operations.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ORGANIZED CRIME

At this point, we must note the role played by the KGB, police, and other government officials in tlic Russian saga of organized crime. Typically referred to as "state rackets" (Shabalin et al., 1990, p. 22), tlicse subsume those types of criminal enterprises in which official position and power are used to extort or protect the victims. Rosner (1993, p. 3) tells us how party officials, witli the backing of the law, imprisoned more than 200,000 entrepreneurs and tlien often took over their enterprises. The growth and proliferation of tlicse criminal types of organizations, as Timofeyev (1990, p. 60) observes, have come to control large regions, as has been demonstrated in Uzbekistan, and have come to serve the interests of tlie Communist Party, the armed forces, and the secret police. Rosner (1993, pp. 1-2) notes tliat in tlie quest for wealth and power, KGB leaders and other officials of the state looted state-run industries and turned these positions into vehicles for increasing their own personal wealth. Indeed, some KGB officers added to their personal wealth by confiscating the personal property of those arrested for state crimes, often burglarizing the homes or apartments of those incarcerated and then either keeping the goods for tlieir own use or turning them over for sale in the black market. The KGB was reorganized in May 1991 and became known as the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. As such, it became, for the first time, a "union-republic" agency. The belief is that the new KGB lias the intent of repenting for its past political misdeeds (Azreal & Rahr, 1993, p. 5); however, many believe that the organization changed only in the upper echelons and that the basic membership of tlie organization remains the same. For this reason, as Stephen Handelman (1994, p. 15), testifying in June 1994 before (lie Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe, stated, U.S. police are reluctant to get involved not only with the KGB but also with most police forces in Russia because they suspect that these organizations continue to be generally corrupt.

The severity of the status of state rackets operating in Russia is revealed in Handelman's testimony when he notes (1994, p. 11) that, in 1993 alone, no fewer than 1,500 Russian government officials were cliarged with serious corruption, and another 4,500 cases of bribery went to trial. These statistics, as Handelman observes, hardly begin to match the real volume of corruption that continues to go on undetected.

Added to this level of corruption is that found among the police and the military. The chief of Moscow's police force estimates that, on his force alone, 95% of his men are on (lie take ("Russia's Mafia," 1994, p. 22). Those who are honest have to work under the most dire conditions, with no equipment or antiquated equipment. As Handelman states (1994, p. 11), detectives in some cities literally are forced to chase their suspects by using taxis or bus services.

Speaking to the issue of police problems in Russia in 1992, V. Kutushev noted that, in the United States, with tlie exception of inner-city residents, there typically is respect for tlie police and friendly interaction between citizens and police. In Russia, this is not the case. When police in Russia attempt to arrest a citizen, they are most likely to meet with resistance. The number of policemen killed in 1991 was 140, and each year tlie number increases.

As for the military, in February 1993, Russian defense officials stated that they planed to discipline 3,000 army officers for questionable business enterprises, and 46 general officers faced court martial proceedings regarding corruption charges (Hersli, 1994, pp. 67-68). Such corruption and tlie delving into criminal enterprises by military personnel no doubt have been spawned by the deplorable living and fighting conditions that military personnel have been subjected to in recent years. The extreme state of these conditions is revealed in the fact that Russian soldiers and their families have recently been forced to go without the basic necessities of water, heat, and food to the point that four recruits died of malnutrition (Time, 1994с, p. 81).

And so, the protection and extortion groups, those with political or police protection and tliose without, have established themselves on the streets of Russia and its independent states. And violence has become a common part of these ventures. In Nizhni Tagil, a city in the Ural Mountains, the extreme form that this violence can take was illustrated when a group of Russian criminals liijackcd a T-90 tank, drove it to the local market, and fired at a criminal group of Muslims who were trying to wrestle protection money from the vendors (U.S. News & World Report, 1994a). The Russians, in doing so, let the Muslim criminals know that this would continue to be solely their enterprise.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY SYNDICATES

The evolution and growth of syndicated crime in Russia and the former republics are evidenced in the development of criminal ventures in which the tliree elements of syndicated crime are fully established-that is, (a) the rendering of illegal goods and services, (b) the use of violence or the threat of it, and (c) the assurance of protection from legal interference. Here we see the establishment and functioning of syndicates that involve and evolve from a variety of ethnic, social class, and other backgrounds. Their major enterprises are prostitution and the smuggling of drugs and other goods. Because both of these enterprises necessitate that the public seeking the illicit service and the criminals who deliver them interact or make contact with one another, political protection is necessary for their continued operation.

Thus, in prostitution, women, homosexual men, and other individuals whose services can be sold For profit are made available in certain areas of tlie cities or are "on call" for the customer who seeks more privacy in the encounter. If necessary, tlic women or men are transported to various regions or even into other countries, depending on trade demands and profits. Reminiscent of (lie Prohibition Era in the United States, these women and homosexual men often are subject to physical and other abuse if they disobey tliose who oversee their work.

Although tlie smuggling into Russia of automobiles stolen in the United States and used cars from Japan, along witli the smuggling of antique artworks out of (lie country, constitute a form of high profit for criminal syndicates, drug smuggling is tlie venture tliat reaps the largest profits. By its very nature, as Albini (1992, chap. 4) explains, drug syndicates typically involve functionaries from various countries interacting will) one another. Because, as Sterling (1994b, p. 105) notes, the Russian former republics produce 25 times more liasliisli than (lie rest of the world and opium poppies flourish in abundance in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and other territories of tlie former U.S.S.R., tlie drug trade in contemporary Russia is alive and well. Drug traffic flows both within and outside Russia and its federated states. As such, it lias attracted smugglers from all parts of tlie world, and the ties between Russian syndicates and those in other countries literally encircle tlie globe. This lias created what Pliil Williams (1995b, pp. 60-61) calls "strategic alliances," alliances in which tlic functionaries of criminal syndicates in various countries, like (lie functionaries of businesses that engage in legitimate ventures, seek and form associations that are mutually beneficial to their operations.

Sterling (1994b) speaks repeatedly of "the Pax Mafiosi," giving the impression that syndicates, particularly tliose in Sicily, live now establislied and made an everlasting peace with one another because of their realization that cooperation, rather than conflict, will more effectively divide tlie spoils for all. This, we believe, is an uneasy conceptualization describing an uneasy form of peace treaty. So, too, Sterling seems to give the impression that such peace treaties are new to the world of drug smuggling and exist primarily among and between large, well-established syndicates. Williams (1995b) shows us, however, that such alliances exist among many small syndicates as well. But we believe that Sterling's Pax Mafiosi can be misleading because of the impression tliat it has now become a new, continuing and lasting form of interaction. If we draw from simulation or game theory, the n-person, non-zero-sum-game model, theoretically, would explain why such cooperation takes place: mainly, because both or all parties stand to gain in the venture. This assumes a rationality of action that may appear valid in theory, but in the reality of life, all too often human behavior manifests a logic predicated on emotion, culture, and attributes other than logic. Thus, as Williams (1995b, pp. 68-69) illustrates in regard to (lie interaction of the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, although in the early 1980s they began in a slate of alliance and cooperation, by Ilic end of tlic 1980s, they were, in effect, at war with one another. Speaking to the point of the cooperation and conflict tliat typically occur among functionaries of criminal syndicates, Handel-man (1994, p. 22) makes our point succinctly when he states:

Criminals arc just like governments. ... I mean ... governments ... can't get it together, criminals can't either.

The contemporary syndicates operating in Russia and its federation, primarily those involved in drug smuggling and other organized syndicated crimes, have evolved from various social-cultural origins. Thus, many thieves-within-the-code gangs, having the brotherhood structure that they manifested during the era of the Soviet Union, have increasingly provided themselves with political and police protection; in so doing, they have moved into syndicated forms of organized crime such as drug smuggling and prostitution. Others continue to operate primarily in mercenary forms of organized crime. Thus, according to one source ("Russia's Mafia," 1994, p. 20), when Russia moved toward privatization, these thieves-within-the-code gangs, because they had amassed large sums of capital, proceeded "to buy a state that was in the process of being rebuilt."

According to Handelman (1994, p. 13), these thieves within the code generated further wealth after the fall of the Soviet Union through their participation in the black market. Many of these "thieves," Handelman notes, are functionaries on both upper and lower levels in both syndicated and mercenary types of organized criminal enterprises in contemporary Russia.

As is true of many organized crime groups in Russia and other countries, ethnicity is a factor in the origin and development of such groups. Ethnicity often serves as a basis from which organized criminals draw membership in gangs and for trust among gang members. Hence, the Chechen syndicate has an ethnic and historical base (Serio, 1992, pp. 6-7). The Chechens are largely a Muslim group that were deported from their homeland in the Caucasus region of Russia by Stalin in 1944 on charges of collaborating with the Nazis. They returned in 1957. According to Serio, the Chechens are different from many other criminal syndicates operating in Russia today in that they draw their membership exclusively from their ethnic ranks and have a hierarchical arrangement based on clan relationships. This group is involved in a variety of mercenary and syndicated crime activities, including smuggling automobiles and the sale of narcotics. A group known for its use of extreme violence, it operates not only in Russia but also in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and other European countries. The Chechens supposedly have recently sent members to New York to set up operations in the United States.

Although it is difficult to assess the full extent and ramifications of Russian organized crime in the United States, Rosner (1986, chap. 4) discusses its presence in Brighton Beach, New York, and Kenny and Finckenauer (1995, pp. 275-280) mention its presence in New York City, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. These groups, it seems, are involved in extortion, drug trafficking, medical fraud, and a variety of other enterprises. It is still too early to determine the full extent of their criminality and what directions they will take. Their patterns and enterprises, however, suggest that they engage in organized criminal ventures similar to those of other American syndicates currently functioning in American society.

CONCLUSION

This, then, is the nature of organized crime in Russia. We have presented a portrait of its history, structure, and function to lay a foundation for future study. We hope that our description and classifications will become the basis for comparisons with organized crime in other countries and cultures because there are many lessons to learn from the Russian experience.

But we end our discussion with an understanding that what has taken place in Russia exemplifies what can happen to societies that experience rapid and intense social change. The portrait we have painted should not be viewed as one of Russian society or the Russian people as being totally morally corrupt. If such were the case, there would not be so many voices in Russia seeking solutions and turning to other countries for help. By comparison, the United States has not been without its own forms of corruption. Watergate and the savings-and-loan scandals have affected U.S. society and serve as reminders that the United States, when it comes to morality, is not without moral weaknesses. Indeed, because of its moral hypocrisy concerning illicit drug use, syndicated crime in America is doing so well.

As we take a parting look at our portrait of Russian organized crime, let's depart with an understanding that what has occurred and is occurring in Russia and its federation has its basic roots in the social upheaval that results from rapid social change. The roots lie in the nature of the destructive forces that accompany a nation that has truly experienced "convulsion" resulting from a series of intense shock waves that have politically, economically, and socially battered Russia and the Soviet Union during this century. First came the Russian Revolution, which appeared to be a movement geared toward freedom for the proletariat, but was it really freedom that resulted when, in fact, as Short reminds us, "Lenin maintained himself in power by force of arms" (1993, p. 3)?

Then, in 1941 came the Nazi invasion and the Soviet struggle for survival against this oppressor. Then, in the 195Us came tlie Cold War and the potential threat of conflict with the United States. Then, in 1989-1991 came the breakdown and breakup of the Soviet Union and its republics.

When human beings undergo such rapid changes and stress, it is referred to as "trauma." Although we do not usually use the term to apply to societies, "trauma" is what Russian society has repeatedly experienced during this century. As tlie wall of communism came down, various sectors of Russian society and its republics began their own attempts at effecting or resisting further change. Indeed, as Sliortt (1993, p. 39) points out, tlic Russian organized criminals at (lie time opposed tlic breakup because they feared the breakup would create, as it did, new national borders, thus making the payment of bribes a requirement for transporting their illegal goods across these borders. Political officials, serving as patrons to their sympathizing clients, purposefully attempted to create political upheaval; these upheavals produced many forms of political-social organized crime. During tlie same time period, however, many of these political officials, while engaging in their efforts to create social disturbances, continued to receive money for services rendered, sold ranks, and protected one another by participating in the criminal enterprises of a shadow economy (Shabalin et al., 1990,p.26).

This social trauma reached the point where President Boris Yeltsin, on June 14, 1994, issued a decree, "On the Urgent Measures to Defend the Population Against Gangsterism and Other Kinds of Organized Crimes." The decree introduced strict legal measures that could be used against organized crime groups. Whether these measures will be applied successfully remains to be seen. Rosner (1993), writing long before this decree was issued, had already addressed the issue and expressed the opinion that a crackdown on the newly formed criminal groups "would be an arbitrary act in the battle for power, under the guise of a crime control solution" (p. 3). And so, we end our discussion with the awareness that Russia and its former republics are at that stage of social change where it is difficult to predict with accuracy in which direction they will go. Some critics fear a return to a complete state of communist rule; others fear that Russia will become a dictatorship if Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Time, 1994a, pp. 39-45) were to come to power. Others, like Vladimir Kvint (1994), suggest that Yeltsin could restore the Russian monarchy and make himself a regent for life.

Although public opinion polls in Russia show that Russians are in favor of conversion to a free enterprise system, Pipes (1990) warns that this may be merely a reflection of a panacea and that "it will lake a long time to reorient the psyche of the people in a direction conducive to genuine economic freedom" (pp. ix-x). Paul Klebnikov (1994b, p. 228), in contrast, believes it is a strong possibility that Russians, by swapping foreign bank credit for shares in Russian oil and gas companies, will put their economy back together again. If what Klebnikov suggests does happen, this would serve as a motivating factor to strengthen what some see as a strong desire on the part of the Russian people to move toward privatization and democracy.

Oddly enough, the social upheaval that has taken place in Russian society in the past century is reflected once again in the current plans to reconstruct the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow (U.S. News & World Report, 1994b, pp. 67-68). This cathedral is a dynamic symbolic reminder of Russia's century of trauma. In 1812, Czar Alexander I ordered its construction in gratitude to God for Russia's victory over Napoleon. It took 70 years to build. In 1931, Stalin ordered it destroyed to obtain the copper and marble from its structure and to make way for a monument to communism, a building that was to be taller than the Empire State Building and an accompanying statue of Lenin bigger than the Statue of Liberty. This palace of Soviets, however, never materialized. Today, there are plans to reconstruct the cathedral, making it identical to the one destroyed by Stalin.

Despite its major problems, Russia has produced, during this century of conflict, some of the world's most beautiful music and art, Nobel Prize winners, the awe-inspiring sculptures of Vadim Sidur (Daniloff, 1994), and one of the world's most successful space programs. Indeed, it is to Russians that American astronomers are turning for help in a menace to the earth more far-reaching than organized crime-mainly, the potential dangers from destructive, near-earth asteroid collisions (L. Friedman, Executive Director of the Planetary Society, personal communication to senior author, 1994). It is believed that between 1,000 and 2,000 objects-asteroids and husks of old comets-now orbit the sun in the earth's immediate neighborhood. Any of these, scientists hypothesize, if they were to collide with the earth, could potentially put an end to human civilization. We hope that Russian and American scientists, working together and studying this phenomenon, can avert it, because if one of these objects of sufficient size strikes the earth, there will no longer be any reason to worry about or study the phenomenon of organized crime.